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The various Belgian social security schemes are facing an uncertain fu-
ture. The general trend toward demographic aging across all of the devel-
oped world and large parts of the developing world has not left Belgium
unaﬀected. Demographic aging is the result of a combination of two trends.
First, there has been a substantial decrease in fertility rates of women over
the last few decades. Second, we have observed a strong increase in life ex-
pectancy across most categories in the population. Unfortunately, these
trends have a strongly negative ﬁnancial impact on a variety of social in-
surance and social protection programs, ranging from child support pay-
ments, the health care sector, to questions of retirement income and long-
term care arrangements. While the problem can be approached in a myriad
of ways, we approach it from the perspective of the social security system,
thus largely leaving aside the question of health care and long-term care
costs. While it is true that this focus inhibits a truly global view of the ﬁ-
nancial consequences of aging for government budgets, it is also true that
introducing them would cause tremendous problems in terms of modeling
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For the social security systems to survive this demographic process,
higher contribution levels and/or lower beneﬁts will have to be introduced,
given the outright pay-as-you-go (PAYG) nature of these systems. Indeed,
a straight increase in the public debt ﬁnancing of the demographic transi-
tion is not truly an option in Belgium, as it would be totally incompatible
with the Maastricht criterion of the European Economic Monetary Union
(EMU) relating to the level of GDP.1 But even beyond this purely institu-
tional limit, a further increase in public debt levels is also ﬁnancially un-
sustainable, as it would quickly cause a snowball eﬀect like the one ob-
served in Belgium in the 1980s.
Leaving aside these purely demographic considerations, other factors
are challenging the way the Belgian social security institutions and systems
are organized. First, there is the potential for increased labor mobility. At
present, mobility between jobs in the public sector, the private sector, and
in self-employment is rather limited, at least partly because of the way the
three systems work. The needs of the labor market of the future, with its in-
creased degree of ﬂexibility, may thus induce large changes in the way the
three corresponding social security systems work. International job mo-
bility is also becoming more and more important, particularly for a small,
open economy in the heart of Europe like Belgium. Jousten and Pestieau
(2002) argue that both levels of intra- and intergenerational redistribution
will be heavily aﬀected by increased international labor mobility, even if
the phenomenon is limited to some subgroups of the population.
The second and biggest nondemographic challenge is the widespread
use of a variety of early retirement programs. In fact, Belgium excels in the
use of these programs, as the world-leading low average retirement age of
approximately 57 for men clearly illustrates.2Originally these systems were
motivated by several objectives. Faced with an environment of industrial
restructuring, early retirement seemed to be the royal route out of the prob-
lem for all partners involved. First, it allowed companies to lay oﬀ old
workers and, if needed, hire cheaper young workers, while the government
supported a large chunk of the costs.3 Second, older workers were also en-
couraged by the trade unions to leave so as to free up space for younger
ones. To the present day, many older workers believe that they make a de-
cision that is beneﬁcial to their younger counterparts. Third, successive
governments since the 1970s were also political gainers, though ﬁnancial
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1. Belgian national debt currently hovers at a level of approximately 110 percent of GDP.
2. The average age of retirement of 57.6 for men was estimated by Blöndal and Scarpetta
(1998) on the basis of Labor Force Surveys. In this study we estimated an average retirement
age of 58.4 for men and 57.4 for women.
3. Belgium is a country where the age proﬁle of wages is steeply increasing, with the length
of the working career making older workers quite expensive.losers, in this consensus toward early retirement, because it allowed the
government to show a better performance in terms of unemployment (par-
ticularly youth unemployment) and guaranteed a social peace. Lately,
however, these early retirement schemes have undergone some scrutiny.
Not surprisingly, the beneﬁcial labor market eﬀects have been rather mod-
est if not completely absent.4 Recent discussions and decisions at the gov-
ernment level clearly move toward the direction of lifting the eﬀective early
retirement age, and hence also the sector-speciﬁc mandatory retirement
ages. Financial costs of early retirement programs to the federal govern-
ment have been huge, both on the income (contributions, taxes) and on the
expenditure side (early retirement beneﬁts).
The goal of this chapter is to simulate the impact of reforms of retire-
ment income systems. The impact we are interested in resides on two lev-
els. First, we consider the ﬁnancial and behavioral impact on individuals
and families. Second, we consider the ﬁnancial impact on the federal gov-
ernment budget. We do not restrict our attention to the budgetary impact
on the social security systems, but rather on all of the federal government’s
ﬁnances. Such reforms will have both an automatic eﬀect on ﬁscal contri-
butions, by changing contributions and beneﬁts for a given work history
(the mechanical eﬀect), and an additional eﬀect through labor supply re-
sponses to the reform (the behavioraleﬀect). We will estimate the ﬁscal im-
plications of both the mechanical and the behavioral eﬀect, using our re-
tirement probit models derived in Dellis et al. (2004) to predict labor
supply responses. The result will be an estimate of the steady-state impact
of the reforms on the ﬁnancial balance sheet of retirement income systems.
The structure of the chapter is as follows. Section 1.2 describes the es-
sential features of the various public retirement and early retirement sys-
tems in Belgium. In section 1.3 we explain the diﬀerent components of our
administrative dataset, as well as the key results of Dellis et al. (2004),
which we heavily rely upon. The following section (1.4) describes the sim-
ulation methodology used. The approach can be qualiﬁed as being of a
steady-state type. Our methodology implicitly assumes that there is a time-
invariant social security program and time-invariant behavior, though this
has obviously not been the case for the systems and the people analyzed in
our sample, where both behaviors and system characteristics have evolved
over time. Section 1.5 describes the simulation results obtained. Again, it
is important to stress that these results have to be interpreted with due dili-
gence because of the limitations inherent in our simulation approach.
Though the results might be rather accurate for the cohort of 50-year-old
workers, this might not be the case for the more general population at other
ages or for other cohorts. Section 1.6 is devoted to the conclusions.
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4. See Sneesens et al. (2003).1.2 Social Security Schemes
The Belgian retirement income system relies on three very unequal pil-
lars.5 First, there are the dominant public social security programs, which
represent the largest part of pension income for a wide majority in the pop-
ulation. A second pillar consists of company pension schemes, which play
only a minor role as a source of income for the average Belgian worker. Es-
sentially, they are currently conﬁned to the higher-income individuals in
the private sector and to the self-employed, a ﬁnding that is at least in part
due to their tax treatment. A third type of retirement income comes from
individual retirement savings. These take multiple forms: there are tax-
favored individual pension savings accounts with a maximum annual con-
tribution of €580 per person,6 or under the form of more traditional sav-
ings vehicles, such as the tax-favored savings accounts, investments in trust
funds, life insurance, and so on.
The ﬁrst pillar, public retirement programs, essentially consists of four
components. There are three large sectoral social security programs, one
for the public sector, one for the private sector wage earners, and one for
the self-employed. Some special categories of workers, such as coal mine
workers and military personnel, have special retirement systems that we
will not explicitly model in the present chapter. A fourth large category of
public retirement income consists of the guaranteed minimum pension
system, which operates on a means-tested basis.
1.2.1 Wage Earner’s Scheme
The wage earner’s scheme is by far the largest one, based on the number
of people aﬃliated with the program. The program allows for retirement
starting at age 60, with a normal retirement age (NRA) ﬁxed at 65. The
choice of retirement age does not induce any actuarial adjustment under
current rules.
However, in the case of most workers, the choice of retirement age is not
completely neutral with respect to the beneﬁt amount, because a full earn-
ings history consists of forty-ﬁve years of work for men, a condition that
many people do not satisfy at the age of 60. For those having more than
forty-ﬁve working years, a dropout-year provision operates, replacing low-
income years by higher ones. The situation has so far been slightly diﬀerent
for women, who only needed forty years to complete a career. A transition
(between 1997 and 2009) is under way to progressively increase the com-
plete career requirement to forty-ﬁve years of work. Hence, for most women
included in our dataset, a full career still consists of forty years of work.
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5. The present section describes the system as in place in the late 1990s. It relies heavily on
Dellis et al. (2004).
6. All ﬁnancial data are presented in EUR of 31/12/2001. Administrative parameters cited
in absolute EUR amounts are those applicable to the year 2001, unless speciﬁed otherwise.Beneﬁts are computed based on earnings during periods of aﬃliation.
The beneﬁt formula, which is subject to ﬂoors and ceilings, can be repre-
sented as follows:
Beneﬁts    
N
n
    average wage   k,
where n represents the number of years of aﬃliation with the wage earner’s
scheme, N the number of years required for a full career (in our case either
forty or forty-ﬁve) and k is a replacement rate, which takes on the value 
of 0.6 or 0.75, depending on whether the social security recipient claims
beneﬁts as a single person or as a household. The variable average wage
corresponds to indexed average wages over the period of aﬃliation, with
indexation on the price index combined with additional discretionary ad-
justments for the evolution of growth. A peculiar feature of the Belgian
wage earners’ scheme is that periods of one’s life spent on replacement in-
come (unemployment beneﬁts, disability beneﬁts, workers compensation)
fully count as years worked in the computation of the average wage, and
hence of the social security beneﬁt. For any such periods, ﬁctive wages are
inserted into the average wage computation. In line with the general phi-
losophy of the Belgian social insurance system—that any such spell on a
replacement income system is purely involuntary—imputed wages are set
equal in real terms to those that the workers earned before entering these
replacement income programs.
Wage earners’ pensions are shielded against inﬂation through an auto-
matic consumer price index (CPI) adjustment and are subject to an earn-
ings test. Currently, the earnings limit is approximately €7,450 per year. For
earnings above this limit, pension entitlement is suspended. Beneﬁts are
also paid to surviving spouses, or more generally, surviving dependents of
deceased wage earners.
The wage earner system is essentially based on the PAYG principle, and
ﬁnanced through payroll taxes that are levied both on the employers and
the employees, with a combined tax rate of 16.36 percent (no earnings
limit). The system also receives annual subsidies and transfers from the
Belgian federal budget that amount to approximately 10 percent of overall
beneﬁts for the period considered.
Next to the oﬃcial wage earner scheme, several forms of early retirement
programs have been developed: mandatory collective early retirement and
individual early retirement. During the 1980s and the 1990s, an arsenal of
mandatory early retirement schemes was put in place. All of these arrange-
ments were and are based on collective agreements, which are negotiated
with the active involvement of employees and employers, sometimes at the
sector level, sometimes at the level of an individual company or production
site. For some companies in a diﬃcult economic position, mandatory re-
tirement ages as low as 50 were introduced. Individual early retirement
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on an individual’s decision to retire from work. During the years analyzed
in our sample, the most prevalent way to do this is to pass through the un-
employment system, in which the unemployed aged 50 or more are con-
sidered “aged unemployed” and are no longer subject to show up at the un-
employment oﬃce on a regular basis.7 Further, there is no control on
availability to work, nor are there beneﬁt cuts due to long-term unemploy-
ment.8 Therefore, people unwilling to continue to work can ask their em-
ployer to lay them oﬀ. Similarly, employers can use the system to shed
older, more expensive workers. The latter are often willing to do so because
of a lack of experience rating in the unemployment insurance system. In
the early years of the new millennium, a new technique has even reinforced
the use of the unemployment insurance system as a retirement route. The
technique, called canadry dry pensions, consists in a lump-sum transfer
from the employer at the time the company lays oﬀ its worker. This lump
sum is not formally a retirement pension, but clearly looks like one.
1.2.2 Public Sector Employees
Public sector pensions are paid out of the general federal budget and are
oﬃcially considered as deferred income rather than old-age insurance. The
only oﬃcial insurance element is a coverage for survivor beneﬁts, which is
ﬁnanced through a 7.5 percent payroll tax. No spousal beneﬁts are avail-
able. Civil servants face compulsory retirement at the latest at age 65, for
both men and women. However, for the private sector, there is a multitude
of ways of retiring earlier than this normal age of 65.9 There is disability
protection, which is a much more plausible route to retirement than in the
private-sector system, as the screening is considered to be much less severe.
Most importantly however, it is possible to opt for an incomplete career
and retire at 60. For some particular categories of workers, the normal re-
tirement age is lower than 65, and early retirement provisions are some-
times extremely generous (military servicemen, teachers). Public sector
pensions are based on the income earned by an individual during the last
ﬁve years before retirement. Beneﬁts are computed according to a rather
complicated formula but can never exceed 75 percent of the average wages
over the last ﬁve years. The beneﬁt formula can be represented as follows:
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7. Disability is not a major route toward early retirement, due to rather stringent qualify-
ing conditions and rather advanced screening.
8. The system of the aged unemployed was reformed in July 2002. The rules were tightened
for new entrants to the unemployment system, with grandfathering rules applicable to those
already in the system. The minimum age for a full waiver of obligations under the unemploy-
ment insurance system was raised to 56. A new system of “mini-waiver” was introduced onto
the periodic visits to unemployment insurance as of age 50, but the person still needs to be
ready to accept a job.
9. Currently, less than 15 percent of civil servants retire at the age of 65.beneﬁt   average wage over last ﬁve years   min ( fract; 0.75),
where fractis a fraction with a numerator consisting of the number of years
the person worked in the public service, the denominator being a beneﬁt
accrual factor. This latter beneﬁt accrual factor, also called tantième, de-
pends on the rank the person occupies in the hierarchy. This denominator
ranges from 30 to 60, taking the value of 30 for the highest-ranking civil
servants (high court judges, university professors) and 60 for the lowest
ranks. As in the private sector wage earners’ scheme, the system is earnings
tested. The system also applies ﬂoors and ceilings, which are, however,
much more generous than for private sector retirement beneﬁts. Most no-
tably, higher-income individuals get a much better deal in the public sector
than in the private sector. This ﬁnding is reinforced once we consider in-
dexation rules, as public sector pensions are indexed on average wages
(péréquation). Public servants therefore enjoy the beneﬁts of productivity
increases in the economy even beyond the moment when they actively con-
tribute to them as workers.
1.2.3 Self-Employed
The self-employed retirement scheme is the latest one to have been in-
troduced, as it has only existed since 1956. It is also the least generous of
the three big social security systems, with retirement beneﬁts close to the
level of the guaranteed minimum income (see the following). The self-
employed are not entitled to unemployment beneﬁts, nor to early retire-
ment beneﬁts. Disability beneﬁts exist, but both qualifying conditions and
ﬁnancial characteristics of the system make it a most unlikely exit route to
retirement. For a very long time, old-age pensions have been independent
of earnings levels. However, since 1984, the system is progressively being
transformed to allow for a stronger link between contributions and bene-
ﬁts. Additional earnings past 1984 enter the pension computation formula
at their correct value, instead of some ﬁctive amount. Full beneﬁts are
available at age 65 for men with a complete earnings history of forty-ﬁve
years. However, anticipated retirement is possible as early as age 60, with
an actuarial reduction of 5 percent per year of anticipation. As for the
wage earners’ scheme, women are in a transitory phase, with the complete
career requirement shifting from forty years of work to forty-ﬁve, and nor-
mal retirement age from 60 to 65.
The social security system of the self-employed is ﬁnanced through two
broad categories of income. First, there are direct social insurance contri-
butions levied under the form of a tax of 16.7 percent on the ﬁrst €46,035
of income, and 12.27 percent on the income in the bracket between €46,035
and €67,352. Income above the latter threshold is not subject to social in-
surance taxation. More than 75 percent of the contributions raised using
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employed; the remainder serves to cover health care and other social in-
surance beneﬁts for the self-employed. Second, the federal government
pays a large subsidy to the system, which amounted to more than a third of
beneﬁts in the years 2003 and 2004.
1.2.4 Guaranteed Minimum Income
The guaranteed minimum income pensions are fully paid for by general
government revenue, and are means tested. This type of pension is only
available after the legal retirement age.
1.3 The Model
We opt for an approach of microsimulation relying on the data and esti-
mates used in Dellis et al. (2004). The underlying data stem from ﬁve diﬀer-
ent sources, most of which are of administrative origin. The diﬀerent data
were merged using the national identiﬁcation number, which is the Belgian
equivalent to the U.S. Social Security number.
The ﬁrst component of the data is the SFR (Fiscal Revenue Statistics)
ﬁles, which are collected by the Finance Ministry and then processed by the
INS (National Statistics Oﬃce). We use the SFR ﬁles for the years 1989 to
1996 to extract all the information relevant for the computation of indi-
vidual tax liabilities. Variables available include wage income and income
from other professional activities, household size and type, number of de-
pendents in the household, age and income of spouse, social insurance
transfers and private pension receipt, house ownership status (owner,
renter), taxable real estate income, and contributions to second- and third-
pillar pensions. The second component is the CIP (Individual Pension Ac-
count), which includes all career information relevant for the wage earner
pension computation: gross wages, days of work, days on social insurance
programs, and so forth. The third and fourth components are the equiva-
lent datasets for the self-employed and civil servants, both of whose ﬁles
are less detailed than the one for wage earners. Finally, information from
the census (1991) is merged in to determine education levels, so as to be able
to use survival tables that are education-level speciﬁc.
Dellis et al. (2004) used a multistep sample selection procedure to obtain
a sample of households where at least one member of the household is in
the 50 to 64 age bracket and has not yet retired. A total of 21,818 house-
holds was used to separately analyze retirement decisions of men and
women. Using the data, the authors estimated the parameters of retire-
ment probit models. Among the explanatory variables in the estimation,
the authors paid particular attention to ﬁnancial incentive measures. We
use several diﬀerent indicators to measure the impact of the social security
systems’ incentives. First is the concept of household social security wealth
50 Raphael Desmet, Alain Jousten, Sergio Perelman, and Pierre Pestieau(SSW), which is the present discounted value of all future beneﬁt ﬂows
from a given social security system. Discounting is done allowing for both
time preference and mortality adjustments. Further, SSW also has to allow
for the possibility of people being subject to diﬀerent retirement income
systems. The authors apply the oﬃcial rules that exist for cumulating ben-
eﬁts from the three main public systems. Hence, the total SSW is the
weighted sum of the diﬀerent pathways to retirement available to the indi-
vidual or to the couple. The weights on the early-retirement routes and the
unemployment/disability routes correspond to the sum of observed fre-
quencies of these routes among all people of any given age up to age 65,
when the public retirement system takes the residual weight. For wage
earners, we group the unemployment insurance and disability insurance
paths, as the two systems produce very similar beneﬁt structures. Doing so,
we give an upper bound on incentives for people to retire, as we render all
disability voluntary. Given the lack of information for the public sector, we
consider as early retirees all persons retiring before the age of 60.
The next two incentive indicators are forward-looking measures. Peak
value (PV) represents the diﬀerence between SSW at its peak and SSW to-
day. The other forward-looking measure is the concept of option value
(OV), such as deﬁned by Stock and Wise (1990), which is based on a utility
maximization framework. The utility function V t underlying the computa-
tion of the option value process can be summarized by the following math-
ematical expression:




   ∑
S
s r
 s t[kBs(r)] ,
where the ﬁrst expression on the right-hand side represents the utility de-
rived from labor income Y, and the second expression represents utility de-
rived from retirement income Bs(r);   is the time-preference rate, which we
assume to be approximately 0.97, which corresponds to a discount rate of
3 percent;  corresponds to a parameter of concavity and is set to   0.75.
Finally, k 1.5 expresses the relative weight of utility of retirement income
as compared to wage income. It reﬂects the fact that the income without
eﬀort generates more utility than income with eﬀort.
The concept of option value Gt(r∗) is then deﬁned as the diﬀerence in util-
ity terms between retiring at the best point in the future (r∗) and now (t).
Gt(r∗)   V t(r∗)   V t(t)
The key estimates of the authors are summarized in tables 1.1 and 1.2.
1.4 Simulation Methodology
For our simulations purposes, we restrict our attention to a subsample
of the previously discussed dataset. We use a cross-section of individuals








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.instead of the entire age range (50 to 64). More speciﬁcally, we consider
preretirement-age workers (male and female) aged 50 and then age them
forward. We also include their spouses in our analysis. More speciﬁcally,
we select all 50-year-old men and 50-year-old single females of the sample.
Married 50-year-old females are excluded from the sample to avoid double
counting, as our sample will account for the ﬁscal impact of all married fe-
males. This way, the cohort can be deﬁned as a representative sample of
Belgian 50-year-old workers and their spouses. To ensure a suﬃcient
sample size, we use a synthetic age-50 cohort made up of individuals aged
50 in 1993, 1994, or 1995. This gives us a total sample size of 4,927 individ-
uals, 2,515 men, 2,020 dependent women, and 392 working women.
We ﬁrst estimate the probability that each worker will exit the labor force
via death or retirement at each future age. Exit probabilities are computed
using the estimates of tables 1.1 and 1.2 under the baseline setting with re-
gard to all variables, including the SSW and peak and option value indica-
tors. Spouses are supposed to retire at the early retirement age of the cor-
responding retirement scheme. In a second step, all these probabilities then
serve as weights in the computation of the present discounted value (PDV)
of the in- and outﬂows from the government budget. The ﬁnancial ﬂows
considered are all ﬂows from age 50 up until death.10 This marks a diﬀer-
ence with respect to Dellis et al. (2004), as we consider the full budgetary
costs and beneﬁts of the synthetic cohort as it ages. The total impact of in-
dividuals on the government’s budget is measured as the diﬀerence between
the outﬂows from the budget as measured by the ﬂow of social security and
other social insurance program beneﬁts (unemployment and early retire-
ment) and inﬂows as measured by payroll, income, and consumption taxes.
Payroll taxes include health, retirement, unemployment, disability, profes-
sional sickness, and workers’ compensation contributions.
Next to the previously mentioned payroll taxes, we include income taxes
on labor and pension income as well as consumption taxes under the form
of value added tax (VAT). We incorporate direct taxes in accordance with
the Belgian Personal Income Tax Code IPP (Personal Income Tax), thus
also including the favorable tax treatment of pension income. However, to
render the computation feasible, we have fully individualized the tax ac-
counts of husbands and wives, while the tax code only allows a partial split-
ting of incomes of spouses. Further, we decided to ignore some other tax
code provisions. For example, we left aside the possibility of itemizing de-
ductions in favor of the standard ﬂat-rate deduction, and we ignored taxa-
tion of private annuity income. The likely impact of these simpliﬁcations is
diﬃcult to assign, as these omissions are to some degree oﬀsetting. Re-
garding consumption taxes, we rely on consumption data by income quar-
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10. To ensure international comparability across the diﬀerent countries considered, we dis-
count all ﬁnancial variables back to the age of 55, using a 3 percent real discount rate.tiles from the Household Budget Survey of the INS. Using the expenditure
shares of diﬀerent products in the typical household consumption basket
by income quartile and weighting the corresponding VAT rates accord-
ingly, the INS data imply an average VAT rate by income of 10.65 percent
for the lowest income quartile, 10.60 for the second, 10.04 for the third and
9.14 for the top income quartile. We apply these average rates for all age
groups in a uniform way.
The concept of PDV is the basis for comparison among diﬀerent policy
reform scenarios. We do so by reestimating the exit probabilities, beneﬁts,
contributions, and taxes under several reform proposals for both spouses
so as to obtain new PDV estimates. We even break down the total eﬀect of
a reform on the PDV into its components: the mechanical budgetary eﬀect
(with unchanged retirement probabilities with respect to the prereform sit-
uation) and the ﬁscal implications of the behavioral eﬀect. We use the ter-
minology ﬁscal implications of the behavioral eﬀect to measure the budget-
ary impact of the labor supply reactions (which is, properly speaking, the
change in the behavior of the individual). Indeed, this distinction is rather
important, as it is quite imaginable to have a strong labor supply reaction
while at the same time having a very limited budgetary impact thereof due
to a high degree of actuarial neutrality.
1.5 Simulation Results
We consider four diﬀerent reforms. The ﬁrst three share a common fea-
ture in that they are not intended as policy recommendations, but rather
are to allow for international comparisons. The fourth simulation is an in-
teresting country-speciﬁc reform of the retirement system, whose only aim
is to illustrate the impact of a partial reform within the Belgian institu-
tional setting. None of the four reforms, however, pursues an objective of
budget neutrality with respect to the baseline, which corresponds to the
current institutional setting and hence not necessarily to one that is viable
in the long run. Nor do any of these reforms aim at establishing a balanced
and viable budget in thelong run.11The ﬁrst two reforms have already been
explored in Dellis et al. (2004) with respect to their impact on the SSW and
accrual variables. However, the present exercise clearly distinguishes itself
from the previous results as it incorporates a complete analysis of all bud-
getary implications of a retirement-system change.
The ﬁrst reform is called the Three-Year Reform, and consists of a simple
increase within three years of all key parameters in all retirement and early
retirement systems in the country. Thus, the early and the normal entitle-
ment ages are increased by three years, as is the length of a normal career—
from forty-ﬁve to forty-eight years. All other system characteristics remain
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11. Hopefully they are more viable than the status quo.unchanged. Implicitly, this approach includes the rather implausible con-
dition that unemployment beneﬁts are totally absent from the landscape
between the ages of 50 and 53.
The second reform, the so-called Common Reform, creates a system
that is identical across all countries. The Common Reform has a beneﬁt
equal to 60 percent of average real lifetime earnings at normal retirement
age, which is deﬁned to be at age 65. Past wages are deﬂated using real-wage
indexing. Average lifetime earnings are supposed to correspond to the
highest forty years of indexed earnings during an individual’s working life.
In case a worker has less than forty years of earnings, zeros are averaged in,
while a career longer than forty years has an impact on the real average life-
time wage through a dropout-year provision. Early retirement is available
as of the age of 60 (ERA), with an actuarial adjustment of 6 percent per
year of anticipation. Beneﬁts thus deﬁned are capped at the 90th percentile
of the wage distribution for men. Beneﬁts are subject to income taxation
under the same rules as in the prereform world. Survivor beneﬁts are paid
out at a rate of 100 percent of workers beneﬁts, but are reduced one for one
for every euro of beneﬁts the recipients receives on his or her own earnings
history. No other beneﬁts are available, which thus represents a rather dra-
matic change in beneﬁt availability before the age of 60 in a country like
Belgium.
The third reform is called the Actuarial Reform. The approach can be
situated midway between the previous two reforms; hence its results will be
presented in second place in the tables and ﬁgures that follow. The reform
keeps the structure of the sectoral social security schemes unchanged with
respect to the present, including eligibility ages, minimum contribution pe-
riods, as well as formulae for the computation of the basic beneﬁts. How-
ever, the reform introduces an actuarial adjustment factor to vary the ben-
eﬁt ﬂow as a function of the age of exit from the labor force, or expressed
diﬀerently, the entry age into retirement. The linear adjustment factor is 6
percent per year of deviation from the normal retirement age, which is cur-
rently 65 under all three major Belgian sectoral pension schemes. Means-
tested programs as well as survivor and spousal beneﬁts are kept un-
changed in their generosity with respect to the baseline situation, unless
they are directly linked to the worker’s own beneﬁts. The age-dependent
nature of workers’ retirement beneﬁts thus implies a relative increase in the
attractiveness of means-tested programs for younger retirees.
The last reform considered is a Belgian Reform. We consider a reform
where the government reforms the current wage earner scheme by no
longer crediting years spent on all kinds of social insurance programs, such
as unemployment insurance, disability insurance, and early retirement in
the individual’s pension record. All other system characteristics are sup-
posed to remain unchanged, thus leaving the early retirement and unem-
ployment paths into retirement intact. Thus, people will be confronted
58 Raphael Desmet, Alain Jousten, Sergio Perelman, and Pierre Pestieauwith incomplete careers at the end of their working life. There is thus a
smaller buﬀering eﬀect against income shocks on a lifetime basis. Another
way of looking at the problem is to notice that the reform introduces a
stronger link between contributions and beneﬁts, and hence reinforces the
pure insurance aspect of the system.
For evaluating the results of the ﬁrst three simulations, we use simulation
methods S1, S2, and S3 of Dellis et al. (2004). Method S1 relies on esti-
mates using a linear age trend, which is unchanged by the reform. It adjusts
the eligibility probabilities for unemployment or early retirement beneﬁt
receipt and applies the postreform incentive and PDV measures. Method
S2 is based on the age-dummy model without a shift of the dummies. It is
essentially the same as S1. However, the age-dummy eﬀects are far from
linear, and hence it is possible that these dummies better pick up the non-
linearities in the various retirement and early retirement systems, or alter-
natively, that tastes for leisure are not a linear function of age. Method S3
is based on the age-dummy models and considers a shift of dummies to
perform the simulations in a speciﬁc way for each one of the reforms. For
the ﬁrst reform, all age dummies are shifted upward by three years. This
also applies to those dummies at ages lower than the earliest eligibility age,
so that the entire retirement hazard shifts forward. For the Common Re-
form we proceed in a similar way, but the impact of age dummies is modi-
ﬁed in a diﬀerent way. On the one hand, given that in this policy simulation
alternative retirement pathways are assumed out, we apply the age-51
dummy to all ages up to age 59, just prior to the early retirement age, both
for men and women. On the other hand, we keep the eﬀect of age-60 and
age-65 dummies unchanged, assuming that the Common Reform will not
aﬀect individual behavior at these particular ages. Finally, using these two
dummy values, we imputed the values of the intermediary dummies, from
age 61 to age 64, assuming a smooth path trend. As for the Actuarial Re-
form and the Belgian Reform, methods S2 and S3 are equivalent, as there
is no change in the key early and normal retirement ages from the base case
to the reform situation.
An initial, noticeable ﬁnding is that the PDV of beneﬁts minus taxes is
negative in all cases considered in table 1.3; thus, the results tell us that our
cohort is a net contributor (beneﬁts minus taxes and contributions) to the
public ﬁnances. At ﬁrst sight, this result looks rather surprising, as it is con-
trary to intuition and contrary to the ﬁnding that we can observe when
purely focusing on the social security system. However, several factors help
explain it. First, it is important to note that direct taxation is extremely
heavy in Belgium. Second, discounting plays an important role in the re-
sults. While taxes are essentially front loaded in the Belgian tax and social
insurance system, beneﬁts are rather back loaded from a life-cycle per-
spective. Third, and last, it is important to notice that we consider only a
single outﬂow of the government budget, while we consider a large array of





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.inﬂows. For example, we consider all tax revenues, even though only some
of them help toward ﬁnancing goods and services for the elderly, while
some public subsidies to the old (e.g., more generous reimbursement of
health expenditures, nursing home care, long-term care, public trans-
portation) do not appear on the outﬂow side.
When measuring the impact of the various reforms on the diﬀerent com-
ponents reported in table 1.3 as a proportion of the baseline beneﬁts, we
ﬁnd that the Common Reform is the most powerful one in terms of the
change in the PDV of beneﬁts, followed by the Actuarial Reform. This
ﬁnding is not too surprising, given the fact that Belgians leave the work-
force rather early in their life cycle, and hence are fully hit by the actuarial
adjustments (Actuarial and Common reforms) and the reduced availabil-
ity of beneﬁts before the early retirement age of the social security system
(Common Reform). The same lack of availability of beneﬁts before the age
of 60 is also the main cause of the drop in income tax receipt under the
Common Reform, with a drop of 5 percent in all but the PV S3 simulation
methodology. Overall, it is fair to say that the impact as measured using the
PV and OV estimates is rather similar.
As for the Belgian Reform, it only displays a rather modest eﬀect in
terms of its impact on the value of the PDV of beneﬁts, while its likely cost
in terms of redistribution is rather heavy. Several reasons help explain this
result. First of all, the reform only aﬀects the wage earners’ schemes, which
casts the order of magnitude of the change in a diﬀerent light. Further, the
eﬀect of the changes only aﬀects one particular form of retirement income,
and does not aﬀect payments, either through the unemployment or the
early retirement systems. Hence, the changes only aﬀect people retiring
early through the change of the beneﬁts they receive starting at age 65, as
the latter remains the age at which people are switched into the retirement
system. Therefore, for a person aged 50, the eﬀect of the changes only
apply on income he or she starts receiving in ﬁfteen years’ time, and this
with an annual 3 percent real discount factor. For a person aged 65, noth-
ing much changes in terms of beneﬁts received, unless (obviously) the per-
son had experienced a longer spell on a social insurance program in the
past. Finally, the reform is somewhat buﬀered by the availability of means-
tested minimum beneﬁts, which increasingly become interesting substi-
tutes for people with incomplete earnings histories due to sickness, unem-
ployment, disability, and so forth.
To illustrate the distinction between the behavioral and mechanical
eﬀects of a reform, let us focus on the net beneﬁts an individual receives in
a world of absolute certainty with respect to his or her life span. We denote
them as b, and they depend on a policy parameter x and on the age of re-
tirement z, itself a function of x. We thus have
b[x, z(x)].
62 Raphael Desmet, Alain Jousten, Sergio Perelman, and Pierre PestieauA reform consists of a change from x to x . The eﬀect (Diﬀ ) of such a re-
form is:
Diﬀ   b[x , z(x )]   b[x, z(x)]
We can decompose Diﬀ into two parts, Diﬀ m and Diﬀ b, corresponding
to the mechanical and behavioral eﬀects, with
Diﬀ m   b[x , z(x)]  b[x, z(x)],
Diﬀ b   b[x , z(x )]   b(x , z(x)],
and Diﬀ m  Diﬀ b   Diﬀ.
Table 1.4displays a strong behavioral eﬀect for all scenarios. This is par-
ticularly true when considering the ﬁrst reform using simulation technique
S3, where the net behavioral eﬀect of beneﬁts minus contributions as a pro-
portion of base beneﬁts is the most powerful (more than a quarter of base
beneﬁts). Table 1.4 shows that the behavioral response for both OV and PV
estimations of the latter scenario imply a ﬁscal impact of the behavioral re-
sponse that represents more than 50 percent of the total eﬀect, essentially
because of the outright shift by three years of all dummies. At ﬁrst sight it
might be curious to have a ﬁscal implication of the behavioral eﬀect that is
negative, that is, that the cohort’s contribution to the government budget
increases as a reaction to the change in its behavior. However, the ﬁnding
is less surprising when we notice that another important variable has
changed as a consequence of this change in behavior, notably the length of
the working life. Hence, the loss of the cohort in terms of net beneﬁts mi-
nus taxes has to be seen as a tradeoﬀfor the gain in income due to a higher-
than-average working life.
Another puzzling point from table 1.4 is the indetermination in the sign
of the behavioral eﬀect on the PDV of beneﬁts. It is positive in most cases,
except for the Belgian Reform, as well as for the Three-Year Reform using
simulation methodology S2 in the Option Value model. Table 1.5 illus-
trates the decomposition by age of retirement of the ﬁscal implication of
the behavioral eﬀect on beneﬁts for a median household facing the Actu-
arial Reform. It appears that the behavioral eﬀect is negative until age 60
and then turns positive, the sign coming from the sign of the probability
change. Even with negative probability changes being larger than positive
ones in absolute value, as is the case in our example, we can observe that
the total behavioral eﬀect for this household is positive. The structure of
the postreform PDV of beneﬁts by age of exit from the labor force helps to
explain this ﬁnding. As the Actuarial Reform is much less penalizing in the
age range 61 to 70 than between the ages of 50 and 60, the PDV of beneﬁts
is steeply increasing as a function of age of the labor force exit, and hence
leads to a positive behavioral eﬀect when aggregating overall possible exit
ages. The same reasoning can be applied to the Common Reform and to a
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.certain degree to the Belgian Reform. In this case, as the structure of the
postreform PDV of beneﬁts does not greatly change from the base case, the
negative probability changes, which typically extends from 50 to 56, creat-
ing a larger behavioral eﬀect than the positive one within the age range of
57 to 70. As to the Three-Year Reform, the probability changes are so er-
ratic that no typical rules can be found.
Figure 1A.1, panels A–G, in the appendix illustrate the eﬀects of the
Three-Year Reform along several diﬀerent margins. Figure 1A.1, panel A
displays the PDV of beneﬁts per worker at any given age of retirement, as
well as the impact thereon by the reform. Figure 1A.1, panel B summarizes
the total of taxes paid by age of labor force exit. This ﬁgure again illustrates
the fact that the elderly are still important contributors to the federal bud-
get. This is particularly true for those working relatively late in their life
cycle, as the ﬁscal pressure on the productive-factor labor is relatively high
compared to the pressure on pension beneﬁts. Figure 1A.1, panels C and
E display the simulated patterns of labor force exit over the age range 50 to
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Table 1.5 Decomposition of the behavioral eﬀect on beneﬁts for a median household (Actuarial
Reform—option value—S2)
Base case Actuarial Reform
PDV  of Probability PDV  of Probability  Probability  Behavioral 
beneﬁts of exit (%) beneﬁts of exit (%) change  eﬀect
Age (a) (b) (c) (d) (d) – (b)   (e) (e)   (c)
50 329,538 0.82 224,385 0.44 –0.38 –855
51 337,893 0.99 227,271 0.53 –0.47 –1,057
52 347,071 2.02 229,978 1.09 –0.92 –2,122
53 354,961 2.19 233,078 1.17 –1.02 –2,379
54 362,829 2.97 236,653 1.59 –1.38 –3,263
55 369,887 5.84 240,407 3.32 –2.51 –6,043
56 376,577 5.21 243,768 3.01 –2.20 –5,366
57 383,305 8.28 246,404 4.98 –3.30 –8,131
58 388,166 9.85 253,870 6.62 –3.23 –8,198
59 393,696 4.41 266,432 3.14 –1.27 –3,392
60 398,815 19.11 279,171 18.42 –0.69 –1,922
61 389,943 11.52 296,357 14.09 2.57 7,604
62 389,340 4.41 319,259 5.86 1.45 4,619
63 386,618 3.77 340,224 5.56 1.79 6,084
64 383,631 2.58 360,614 4.15 1.58 5,684
65 381,773 6.73 381,773 12.05 5.33 20,332
66 356,814 2.71 356,814 4.86 2.15 7,667
67 333,433 1.09 333,433 1.96 0.86 2,883
68 311,112 0.44 311,112 0.79 0.35 1,081
69 289,168 0.18 289,168 0.32 0.14 404
70 268,414 0.12 268,414 0.21 0.09 254
Total 13,88670, which follow a rather smooth pattern for the S1 simulation methodol-
ogy and a more erratic one for simulation methodology S3. The role of the
shift in the age dummies becomes evident in ﬁgure 1A.1, panel E. Figure
1A.1, panels D and F display the age-speciﬁc impact of the reform, with a
rather modest net change (PDV of beneﬁts minus taxes) at all ages, whereas
the change of the PDV of beneﬁts is of varying sign and characterized by
larger swings in magnitude. Clearly, the tax system (payroll, income, and
consumption) plays an important role in the determination of the sign and
magnitude of the net contribution to the federal budget at all possible exit
ages. Figure 1A.1, panel G illustrates the power of these ﬁscal implications
as a proportion of GDP. The ﬁgure shows that the mechanical eﬀects are
approximately of the same size for all possible simulation methodologies,
but that the diﬀerence between these reforms stems from the behavioral
eﬀect.
Figures 1A.2, panels A, B, and C, 1A.3, panels A, B, and C, and 1A.4,
panels A, B, and C in the appendix illustrate the key results for the other
three reforms in terms of the changes in the PDV of beneﬁts and in the re-
tirement probabilities at the diﬀerent ages, as well as the ﬁscal implications
as a proportion of GDP. The latter indicator allows for a comparison of the
total budgetary eﬀect of the various reforms in terms of a common mea-
sure. It appears that—budgetarily speaking—the Actuarial Reform is the
most powerful reform in all cases, excluding those relying on the S3
methodology. Even if the Common Reform has the strongest impact on the
level of beneﬁts because of its inherent ineligibility to retirement beneﬁts
before age 60, it is the Actuarial Reform that creates the strongest incen-
tives for individuals to work longer. Indeed, a comparison of ﬁgure 1A.3,
panel C and ﬁgure 1A.2, panel C shows that the retirement rate is lower for
the Actuarial Reform before age 60, and a bit higher after this age.
1.6 Distributional Analysis
Table 1.6 and table 1.7 display the distributional implications of the re-
forms when splitting the population into ﬁve income categories. A common
feature of the ﬁrst three reforms is that the three middle earnings quintiles,
hence the middle classes, bear the brunt of the reform. This is particularly
true for the Common Reform, where the impact on the two extreme income
quintiles is much less pronounced. The results are less extreme for the case
of the Three-Year Reform, where the changes of all income quintiles are rel-
atively close to one another as expressed in these relative terms. The Actu-
arial Reform again is the middle ground. Only the lowest-income quintile
loses less in relative terms under this reform proposal.
The Belgian Reform, on the other hand, has a very diﬀerent redistribu-
tive pattern. While income quintiles 3 and 4 again face the largest propor-
tional change, as displayed in tables 1.6 and 1.7, it is now the lowest-income
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.quintile that loses out more than the ﬁrst- and second-income quintiles.
The reasons for this ﬁnding are multiple. First, they are due to the way the
reform only aﬀects those that are on the wage earner scheme. Hence, it
does not aﬀect civil servants who have relatively high life cycle earnings,
therefore making them relatively more numerous in the upper-income
quintiles. Second, the reform only touches those with incomplete careers,
and hence essentially touches two categories of people. First, it aﬀects
those with unstable and incomplete career patterns due to sickness, inva-
lidity, unemployment, or accident. Second, it changes incentives for those
choosing to retire early. Hence, the reform is less important for higher-
income white collar workers, who face lower probabilities of layoﬀ, acci-
dent, sickness, and invalidity.
To get a better grasp of the distributive implications of these alternative
extensions, we have used two standard measures of inequality and poverty:
the Gini coeﬃcient and the poverty rate, measured as the fraction of house-
holds with lifetime income (starting at age 50) below 50 percent of the av-
erage lifetime income.
The results are given in table 1.8 for the baseline and the Three-Year Re-
form. Not surprisingly, the comparison between these two cases indicates
that the reform generates more inequality and more poverty than what we
observe in the baseline. The reason is simple: retiring later mostly beneﬁts
high-income households that are concentrated in the top income quintiles.
This comparison is, however, only of a very partial relevance. Compared
to the baseline, the reform scenario generates additional revenue to the sys-
tem. By reallocating this additional revenue among households we could
easily get a more favorable outcome from the standpoint of both poverty
and inequality reduction.
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Table 1.8 Gini indexes and poverty rates
Base Three-Year Beneﬁts reduction
Peak value—S1
Gini index 0.2351 0.2461 0.2550
Poverty rate 2.89 3.82 7.02
Peak value—S2
Gini index 0.2327 0.2422 0.2526
Poverty rate 2.79 2.82 6.78
Option value—S1
Gini index 0.2360 0.2459 0.2568
Poverty rate 2.99 4.27 6.95
Option value—S2
Gini index 0.2363 0.2449 0.2569
Poverty rate 3.06 3.37 7.02However, such a statement is not very precise. To get a sharper compar-
ison, we ﬁrst observe in table 1.9 that the Three-Year Reform brings addi-
tional resources equivalent to about 18 percent of overall beneﬁts.12 These
resources could, for example, be used for ﬁnancing the costs of the ongo-
ing demographic shift, as illustrated by a drastic increase in the depend-
ency ratio. Suppose that instead of raising the eﬀective age of retirement,
as in the Three-Year Reform, we apply a simple linear reduction of bene-
ﬁts to obtain the very same budgetary savings. We can then oppose two
comparable or budget-neutral scenarios. Our computations show that the
linear beneﬁt reduction needed to get an 18 percent resource saving has to
be larger than 18 percent. Indeed, as individuals can have behavioral reac-
tions and as income taxes are paid on beneﬁts, we have to apply a higher
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Table 1.9 Comparison of two reforms with comparable budgetary impact (in € per worker)
Change in present discounted value
Three-Year Beneﬁts reduction (–25%)
Mechanical Behavioral Total Mechanical Behavioral Total
Peak value—S1
Beneﬁts –19,582 4,132 –15,450 –36,979 –693 –37,671
Total taxes –3,592 10,614 7,022 –12,627 1,407 –11,221
Net change –15,990 –6,482 –22,472 –24,351 –2,099 –26,451
Change as % of 
base beneﬁts –10.9 –4.4 –15.3 –16.6 –1.4 –18.1
Peak value—S2
Beneﬁts –20,635 2,210 –18,425 –37,233 –621 –37,854
Total taxes –3,787 12,453 8,666 –12,604 1,287 –11,317
Net change –16,849 –10,243 –27,092 –24,629 –1,909 –26,537
Change as % of 
base beneﬁts –11.4 –6.9 –18.4 –16.7 –1.3 –18.0
Option value—S1
Beneﬁts –18,530 1,785 –16,745 –36,753 –834 –37,588
Total taxes –3,657 10,323 6,666 –12,924 2,624 –10,300
Net change –14,873 –8,538 –23,410 –23,830 –3,458 –27,288
Change as % of 
base beneﬁts –10.2 –5.9 –16.1 –16.4 –2.4 –18.7
Option value—S2
Beneﬁts –18,931 –150 –19,081 –36,724 –731 –37,454
Total taxes –3,743 10,849 7,107 –12,967 2,281 –10,686
Net change –15,188 –11,000 –26,188 –23,756 –3,012 –26,768
Change as % of 
base beneﬁts –10.4 –7.6 –18.0 –16.3 –2.1 –18.4
12. This amount is obtained with the S2 simulation method. For simplicity, we refer only to
this simulation method in the rest of this comparison.reduction on gross beneﬁts to ﬁnally get an additional revenue of 18 per-
cent. A gross beneﬁt reduction of 25 percent seems to work. In other
words, if instead of adopting the Three-Year Reform we cut all beneﬁts by
25 percent, we would end up with an aggregate beneﬁt reduction of 18 per-
cent. This is presented on table 1.9 for diﬀerent calculations of the reform.
We now study the comparative incidence of these two reforms. As table
1.8 shows, both the poverty rate and the Gini coeﬃcient are higher with the
second than with the ﬁrst reform.13
A general conclusion arises from this exercise. The beneﬁt reduction re-
form represents the policy that would be implemented if nothing is done to
limit the problem of ﬁnancing aging. The Three-Year Reform is such a pol-
icy, which decreases the implicit tax on continued work, incites agents to
work longer, leads to more revenue, less spending, and hence ultimately to
smaller budgetary problems. A third type of parametric reform is an in-
crease in social security contributions. This solution has to be ruled out in
the current context of strong ﬁscal competition. Hence, a reform that is
quickly undertaken and that keeps workers in the labor force is better in
terms of redistribution than an emergency reform that decreases beneﬁts
linearly (for some time).
1.7 Conclusions
The analysis just presented shows the large potential budgetary impact
of various hypothetical reforms. These reforms, though clearly selected for
comparative and illustrative purposes, indicate the importance of behav-
ioral eﬀects that citizens display when faced with a varying landscape in
terms of their social insurance architecture. Diﬀerent real-life reform al-
ternatives are imaginable in the Belgian context. Any such real-life alter-
native will have to include—at least to some degree—some elements ana-
lyzed in our stylized scenarios; for example, changes in the key retirement
ages, the use of actuarial adjustment factors, and a convergence between
the three main retirement systems—while at the same time not forgetting
the labor-demand side. The Common Reform admittedly looks somewhat
unrealistic. In that sense, our Belgian Reform is a ﬁrst step in the direction
of getting these hypothetical simulations closer to the ﬁeld. By eliminating
one particular aspect of our largely Bismarckian system, namely an aspect
that is not insurance based, we reestablish a clearer link between contribu-
tions and beneﬁts. The results indicate that even such a partial reform
might have important consequences, not only in levels but also on the dis-
tributional side. The results of the present distributional analysis also il-
lustrate the need to reﬁne the analysis in future research.
However, we would like to insist on the fact that the analysis relies heav-
ily on some assumptions we made—most notably, the limitation to the
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13. For more on this, see Cremer and Pestieau (2003).cohort of 50-year-olds and the steady-state assumption, both of which
clearly limit the generality with which one can apply these results to real-
world proposals. Hence there is a clear need for further research, to get the
reform proposals closer in line with politically feasible and economically
viable alternatives over the long run, as well as to check the robustness of
our simulation approach.
This chapter shows that the social security system at large (i.e., includ-
ing unemployment and disability insurance as well as early retirement
schemes) induces Belgian workers to retire earlier than they ought to. Most
reforms contemplated imply that we bring this comprehensive social secu-
rity package closer to actuarial fairness. We realize that this is questionable
and ought to be viewed as a ﬁrst step toward a more complete analysis of
reforms. Assume, indeed, that a fraction of these early retirees who draw
beneﬁts from disability beneﬁts are truly disabled, and a fraction of those
drawing beneﬁts from unemployment insurance are truly involuntarily un-
employed. A good reform should attempt to identify these workers and let
them beneﬁt from social insurance. This may imply improving the audit
and control procedures, particularly for unemployment. Then, for the re-
maining voluntary early retirees, we would apply our alternative actuarial
reforms.
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Fig. 1A.1 A, PDV of beneﬁts by age of labor force exit (in EUR per worker);
B, PDV of taxes by age of labor force exit (in EUR per worker); C, Distribution of 
age of labor force exit (option value–S1); D, Total eﬀect by age of labor force exit
(Three-Year Reform–option value–S1); E, Distribution of age of labor force exit
(option value–S3); F, Total eﬀect by age of labor force exit (Three-Year Reform–
option value–S3); G, Fiscal implications of the Three-Year Reform as a percent 
of GDP
AFig. 1A.1 (cont.) A, PDV of beneﬁts by age of labor force exit (in EUR per
worker); B, PDV of taxes by age of labor force exit (in EUR per worker); C, Distri-
bution of age of labor force exit (option value–S1); D, Total eﬀect by age of labor
force exit (Three-Year Reform–option value–S1); E, Distribution of age of labor
force exit (option value–S3); F, Total eﬀect by age of labor force exit (Three-Year
Reform–option value–S3); G, Fiscal implications of the Three-Year Reform as a
percent of GDP
B
CFig. 1A.1 (cont.) A, PDV of beneﬁts by age of labor force exit (in EUR per
worker); B, PDV of taxes by age of labor force exit (in EUR per worker); C, Distri-
bution of age of labor force exit (option value–S1); D, Total eﬀect by age of labor
force exit (Three-Year Reform–option value–S1); E, Distribution of age of labor
force exit (option value–S3); F, Total eﬀect by age of labor force exit (Three-Year
Reform–option value–S3); G, Fiscal implications of the Three-Year Reform as a
percent of GDP
D
EFig. 1A.1 (cont.) A, PDV of beneﬁts by age of labor force exit (in EUR per
worker); B, PDV of taxes by age of labor force exit (in EUR per worker); C, Distri-
bution of age of labor force exit (option value–S1); D, Total eﬀect by age of labor
force exit (Three-Year Reform–option value–S1); E, Distribution of age of labor
force exit (option value–S3); F, Total eﬀect by age of labor force exit (Three-Year
Reform–option value–S3); G, Fiscal implications of the Three-Year Reform as a
percent of GDP
F
GFig. 1A.2 A, PDV of beneﬁts by age of labor force exit (in EUR per worker);
B, Distribution of age of labor force exit (option value–S1); C, Fiscal implications
of the Actuarial Reform as a percent of GDP
A
B
CFig. 1A.3 A, PDV of beneﬁts by age of labor force exit (in EUR per worker);
B, Distribution of age of labor force exit (option value–S1); C, Fiscal implications
of the Common Reform as a percent of GDP
A
B
CFig. 1A.4 A, PDV of beneﬁts by age of labor force exit (in EUR per worker);
B, Distribution of age of labor force exit (option value–S1); C, Fiscal implications
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